Return-path: X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 7997;andrew.cmu.edu;Ted Anderson Received: from beak.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail for +dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl@andrew.cmu.edu (->+dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl) (->ota+space.digests) ID ; Fri, 13 Apr 90 02:16:33 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <4a9KuZa00VcJE0xk5h@andrew.cmu.edu> Reply-To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU From: space-request+@Andrew.CMU.EDU To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU Date: Fri, 13 Apr 90 02:16:06 -0400 (EDT) Subject: SPACE Digest V11 #258 SPACE Digest Volume 11 : Issue 258 Today's Topics: Space Shuttle Development (6 of 7) Re: releasing data / digitized images Space Shuttle Development (2 of 7) Space Shuttle Development (4 of 7) Re: Pegsat Update (Forwarded) - 04/09/90 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 12 Apr 90 03:02:13 GMT From: usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!zardoz.cpd.com!dhw68k!ofa123!Wales.Larrison@apple.com (Wales Larrison) Subject: Space Shuttle Development (6 of 7) NASA's cost data base was extensive, based upon up to 6 independent cost analyses designs for similar systems, and very specifically showed the differences in vehicle configuration and recurring cost from limiting development costs. (Example data shown from summary contractor data...) [Summary Data from 3 August 1971 JSC internal report] Grumman Concepts - all 1 1/2 stage, thrust augmented systems. Expendable Expendable Expendable Reuse Liq Booster Liq Booster Solid Bstr Orb & (Reuse Cryo Reuse Orb Reuse Orb Booster Tanks) Reuse Orb DDT&E ($M) Orbiter 2,600 2,615 2,615 2,586 Booster/SRM 153 537 338 2,724 Reuse Cryo Tanks 301 Main Engine 657 769 657 655 Flt test 651 693 664 936 Total 4,362 4,614 4,274 7,079 Production ($M) Orbiter 482 544 544 491 Booster/SRM 1,369 2,612 5,644 1,121 Tanks 2,259 Total 4,110 3,156 6,188 1,612 Operations 998 2,131 1,105 1,475 Total Program 9,470 9,901 11,567 9,988 Peak Annual 1,100 ????? 1,100 1,640 Funding Direct Cost 9.82 10.26 14.66 3.23 per Flight Note:(translating from 1971 dollars to 1990 dollars, yields a cost per flight of 35.84 37.45 53.51 11.79 these were for a 40,000 pound payload system, and yielded a cost per pound (1990$) of $896 $936 $1338 $295 ). NASA still had not been given the official go-ahead for shuttle development, although the primary decision had apparently already been made in the White House. In a calculated measure, NASA was forced by OMB to go through repeated attempts to reduce the Shuttle development costs. (Ref: Pace, Logsdon) Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director of the OMB, told his staff that they had a free hand to work on NASA to reduce program costs. Through November and December of 1971 OMB and NASA fought over the shuttle design and configuration (despite all of the previous contracted studies and study results). To force NASA to consider smaller, lower-cost shuttles, OMB kept specifying specific designs to be evaluated by NASA, and NASA kept arguing against the technical ability of OMB to cost-design a shuttle system. (cont) --- Opus-CBCS 1.10 * Origin: Universal Electronics, Inc. (1:103/302.0) -- Wales Larrison ...!{dhw68k,zardoz,lawnet,conexch}!ofa123!Wales.Larrison Wales.Larrison@ofa123.FIDONET.ORG 714 544-0934 2400/1200/300 ------------------------------ Date: 12 Apr 90 16:31:56 GMT From: hplabsb!dsmith@hplabs.hp.com (David Smith) Subject: Re: releasing data / digitized images In article <1990Apr11.051210.12459@eagle.lerc.nasa.gov> tfabian@mars.lerc.nasa.gov (Ted Fabian) writes: >meanwhile, a bigger question is whether the capability to provide the data >in the format that you all desire even exists... > ... > again, given the density of the data, and the > state of the art available today, putting something in one format > will please some of the people, but not all.. so who picks the format?? > or are multiple copies stored in different formats?? etc. etc... So let the originators make it available in whatever format they use, and make a description of the format available with the data. Let those who want the pix make the format translation. -- David R. Smith, HP Labs | "It is said that St. Patrick drove the dsmith@hplabs.hp.com | snakes out of Ireland. They were last seen (415) 857-7898 | selling junk bonds." -- Johnny Carson ------------------------------ Date: 12 Apr 90 01:47:35 GMT From: usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!zardoz.cpd.com!dhw68k!ofa123!Wales.Larrison@apple.com (Wales Larrison) Subject: Space Shuttle Development (2 of 7) To scope this effort, there are about 100 Phase A studies awarded forevery Phase C/D, since not every conceptual idea is ever pursued. Typical Phase A studies range from $100K to $5M or so, and take up to a couple of years to complete. Phase B studies have at least 2 competitors, usually take 1-2 years to complete, and range in the $5- $50 million range. There is usually only 1 winner of Phase C/D contracts, but the loser may be brought in later, as a "second source" or as a contractor for some parts of the overall system, if their design is superior in those areas (as was done with the F-16 and F-18) From the documentation I have, Space Shuttle design studies began in about 1968, with studies by MDAC of a Gemini-derived 9-12 man spacecraft ("Big-G") for resupplying a space Station. In the heady days after the first moon landing, NASA and the administration had mapped out an overall plan for future space activities which included Space Station, a Lunar Base, Manned Mission to Mars, continued use of the Saturn-series of Rockets, and a Space Shuttle. Ref: "America's Next Decade in Space: A Report for the Space Task Group", NASA, Sep. 1969 To gather more insight into what it would take to accomplish this ambitious plan for space activities, NASA began a series of Phase A and technology studies. (It should be noted this included Phase A studies of Lunar Bases, Saturn-derived launch vehicles, Manned Mars Missions, and Space Stations, among others). They let four Phase A contracts for "Integrated Launch and Reentry Vehicle" studies, totaling $1.8 M, in 1969. These included: o McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC), contract NAS 9- 9204 (with LaRC) of a HL-10 body shape with a straight wing and 25,000 lb payload. o North American Rockwell (NAR), contract NAS 9-9205, (with JSC) of a straight wing vehicle with a 50,000 lb payload. o Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation (LMSC), contract NAS 9- 9206, (with MSFC) for a 1 1/2 stage vehicle with a double delta wing, launched in a triamese configuration. (This is later redirected to 2 stage fully reusable configuration, as the triamese proved unstable.) o General Dynamics (GD), contract NAS 9-9207, (with MSFC), of a triamese vehicle configuration with a two-element swing wing and 50,000 pound payload. Martin Marrieta performed a parallel study effort under company money (they had lost the Phase A competition), which followed the same schedule, of a launcher with a 36,500 pound payload called the "Spacemaster". In parallel, and based upon the results of these Phase A study contracts, NASA (At JSC, MSFC, and LaRC) studied a series of alternative conceptual designs and performed system sizing studies (contractually supported by MDAC), including a "DC-3 Shuttle" design supported by Vought aviation. (Cont) --- Opus-CBCS 1.10 * Origin: Universal Electronics, Inc. (1:103/302.0) -- Wales Larrison ...!{dhw68k,zardoz,lawnet,conexch}!ofa123!Wales.Larrison Wales.Larrison@ofa123.FIDONET.ORG 714 544-0934 2400/1200/300 ------------------------------ Date: 12 Apr 90 01:52:35 GMT From: zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sdd.hp.com!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!zardoz.cpd.com!dhw68k!ofa123!Wales.Larrison@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu (Wales Larrison) Subject: Space Shuttle Development (4 of 7) A detailed independent economic analysis of the Shuttle program was prepared, at the request of Congress. This was made by an outside, non-aerospace consulting firm. This was a pivotal step, in that it forced NASA to identify the Shuttle as the primary means of performing a variety of roles for NASA, DoD, and other users; and forced NASA into a public justification of the Shuttle on near-term financial grounds, when other reasons for such a system were more fundamental (as part of a long term American space strategy). NASA now had to get DoD assurances it would use the shuttle for all its launches and began designing to meet all DoD launch requirements. NASA was forced to show Congress and the Administration how any system selected would be cheaper than any alternative launch system. Results from this economic analysis would be used as the rationale to "phase out" other launch systems. "Economic Analyses of New Space Transportation Systems", Mathematica, Inc., 2 volumes, May 1971 At this point, NASA stopped providing strategy for future space programs, and began a long series of tactical battles focusing on narrower and narrower budgetary battles. It had to meet strict economic criteria imposed by OMB (who maintained an independent shuttle system design group), and was encouraged to design a shuttle that could "do all things and be all things" to all users to get the maximum cost effectiveness. This made it very difficult to accept suggestions for smaller, less capable, and less risky shuttle systems, or to accept the added costs of parallel development programs which could reduce technical risks. While the two stage fully reusable configuration was the option offered the lowest potential cost per flight (as shown by all of the Phase A studies), the overall cost to develop the system was attacked by Congress and OMB. Other options for the Space Shuttle configuration had to be examined. In parallel to the Phase B contracts, Grumman and Lockheed were given supporting contracts to study "Alternative Space Shuttle Concepts" which included a 1 1/2 stage thrust-augmented system, a solid booster/reusable orbiter system, reusable booster and orbiter system, and a minimum risk fully reusable system. This was done as extensions to their Phase A studies, and essentially were parallel Phase B studies to the fully reusable system selected. Each was funded at $14 M. Lockheed, contract NAS 8-26362 (with MSFC), 1970 Grumman, contract NAS 9-11160 (with MSFC), 1970 It should be noted that numerous parallel technology studies were being performed. These included a foamed silica coated borosilicate glass studied for a reusable heat shield (which offered a 10:1 weight reduction and greatly decreased costs over metallic thermal protection systems), reusable cryo tankage, advanced materials, and cryo engines. (Cont) --- Opus-CBCS 1.10 * Origin: Universal Electronics, Inc. (1:103/302.0) -- Wales Larrison ...!{dhw68k,zardoz,lawnet,conexch}!ofa123!Wales.Larrison Wales.Larrison@ofa123.FIDONET.ORG 714 544-0934 2400/1200/300 ------------------------------ Date: 12 Apr 90 20:44:17 GMT From: ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!aries!mcdonald@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu (Doug McDonald) Subject: Re: Pegsat Update (Forwarded) - 04/09/90 In article mikemc@mustang.ncr-fc.FtCollins.NCR.com (Mike McManus) writes: >In article <3344@jato.Jpl.Nasa.Gov> baalke@mars.jpl.nasa.gov (Ron Baalke) writes: >> being analyzed. The two chemical release events will occur over >> Northern Canada between April 14-28, local weather permitting. > >I've heard a lot about the planned barium (right?) release, but nothing about >why it's being done. What is this experiment for? Thanks! > It is going to fog the mirror of the Hubble Space Telescope with barium so it won't work any more. Maybe the HST will be late enough to escape! Doug McDonald> ------------------------------ End of SPACE Digest V11 #258 *******************